


















































Box	1:		 Interoceptive	inference,	emotion,	and	mood	 	 	
	Existing	models	of	interoceptive	inference	primarily	target	emotional	and	affective	aspects	of	perception	and	self	[8,	17,	25,	47].	These	models	propose	that	interoceptive	experience	results	from	inference	on	the	hidden	causes	of	interoceptive	signals,	by	analogy	with	predictive	processing	models	of	exteroceptive	perception	[11,	12]	and	echoing	the	early	ideas	of	von	Helmholtz	of	perception	as	‘unconscious	inference’	[29,	30].	They	extend	earlier	theories	of	emotion	in	two	important	ways.	First,	like	‘appraisal’	theories	[77]	they	emphasize	the	importance	of	context	in	emotional	processing,	but	with	the	advantage	of	eliminating	any	bright	line	separating	emotion	(or	perception)	from	cognition.	Instead,	interoceptive	experience	is	determined	by	inferential	processes	operating	across	multiple	hierarchical	levels	and	encompassing	multiple	modalities.	Second,	instead	of	associating	each	emotion	with	a	discrete	neuronal	circuit	[78],	they	view	emotions	as	constructed	by	neural	processes,	such	as	perceptual	inference	and	memory,	which	reflect	principles	of	structural	and	functional	organisation	that	generalise	beyond	emotion	itself	[79].		As	with	the	relationship	between	exteroceptive	(e.g.,	visual)	perceptual	content	and	predictive	processing,	it	remains	an	open	question	as	to	how	interoceptive	experiences	map	onto	the	computational	machinery	of	interoceptive	inference	(see	e.g.,	[80,	81]	for	examples	in	vision	and	audition).	Interoceptive	experience	might	reflect	the	posterior	belief	directly	[8],	the	trajectories	of	interoceptive	prediction	error	(or	free	energy,	see	Box	2)	over	time	[82],	the	precision	(certainty)	of	the	predicted	somatic	consequences	of	(motoric	or	autonomic)	actions	[18,	82],	and/or	hyper-priors	over	this	precision.	Clark	and	colleagues	recently	suggested	a	hierarchical	arrangement	in	which	emotional	experience	reflects	precision,	while	mood	depends	on	the	hyper-prior	over	this	precision	(i.e.,	expected	precision)	[83].	In	this	interesting	view,	short	term	fluctuations	in	precision	(emotional	responses)	are	constrained	by	mood-related	hyperpriors	that	encode	their	long-term	average.	Beyond	this,	we	note	that	direct	empirical	evidence	for	interoceptive	inference	(e.g.,	interoceptive	prediction	errors)	remains	scarce	([84],	see	Outstanding	Questions).	Which	aspects	of	(active)	interoceptive	inference	shape	conscious	emotional	experience?	While	this	question	also	remains	open,	it	is	tempting	to	speculate	that	expectations	at	higher	(deeper)	levels	of	neuronal	hierarchies	are	more	likely	to	be	implicated,	largely	because	their	predictions	are	domain	general	and	can	therefore	be	articulated	through	autonomic	or	motor	reflexes.				
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